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PEOPLE V THOMAS: FURTIVE GESTURES AS AN ELEMENT OF
REASONABLE SUSPICION-THE ONGOING STRUGGLE
TO DETERMINE A STANDARD
I. INTRODUCTION
As Chief Justice Warren noted in Terry v. Ohio, "[S]treet encounters be-
tween citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity."' Equally
rich in diversity are the interpretations of the fourth amendment 2 protec-
tions against unreasonable search and seizure.3 The history of the fourth
amendment teaches that whether or not a search is a reasonable intrusion in
a given situation is grounded upon more than an individual, ad hoc deci-
sion. 4 Presently, however, there is not an objective methodology established
by the U.S. Supreme Court for determining constitutional reasonableness.
5
The Colorado Supreme Court has likewise struggled, without consistency, to
determine probable cause, reasonableness for search and seizure, and the ex-
clusionary rule.
6
Justice Clark's oft-quoted remark that "There is no war between the
Constitution and common sense" 7 is, sometimes, less true in the practice of
criminal procedure than in other areas of the law. In the attempt to find the
balance between the investigator's need to obtain evidence by search and
seizure, and the individual's right to privacy and personal security, the
courts have wavered from one extreme to the other, straining both common
sense and the Constitution.8 Most commentators agree that the "sliding-
scale" approach which balances these interests, but provides no firm criteria,
is not practical for application by police officers in daily street encounters.
9
Rather, it has been suggested the courts should devise a test that defines the
"quantum" of evidence which must be present before official action is
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
2. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment was made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35-39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
4. Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux. The Rie and Fall ofProbable Cause, 1979 U. ILL.
L.F. 763.
5. Id. at 763.
6. Compare People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272 (1983) with People v. Waits 196 Colo. 35,
580 P.2d 391 (1978).
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
8. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 36 (1968). Justice Douglas' dissent expressed dismay at the
majority's inconsistency and lack of common sense: "We hold today that police have greater
authority to make a 'seizure' and conduct a 'search' than a judge has to authorize such action.
We have said precisely the opposite over and over again."
9. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
MIcH. L. REV. 39, 56 (1968).
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taken.' 0 Then, according to this view citizens would be aware of what be-
havior is reasonably expected of them, and police officers would not need to
risk on-the-spot judgments.
People v. Thomas I" represents an attempt by the Colorado Supreme
Court to tighten and clarify definitions and standards applied in search and
seizure cases. Although Thomas did help to clarify the standards for reason-
able suspicion, the inherent lack of firm standards in police stops has not
been fully addressed. This article traces the federal and state judiciary's fail-
ure to develop consistent and objective standards for application of fourth
amendment principles and concludes with two alternatives to the traditional
ad hoc analysis. This new approach would provide an easily delineated and
minimally intrusive procedure for law enforcement officers to adopt in "stop
and frisk" encounters which result in searches for drugs.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
A. Warrantless Searches
The fourth amendment was designed to ban arbitrary and unjustified
searches and seizures. 12 The requirement of a judicially issued search war-
rant was chosen by the authors of the Constitution to aid these goals. 13 The
general rule that police must whenever possible obtain an advance warrant
recognizes the inherent danger of subjecting citizens to searches and seizures
based on "suspicion-charged judgments of police officers engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'
14
B. Arrests, Stop and Frisk, and Investigatory Stops
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others ... 5
The pivotal question in most search and seizure cases is whether the
suspect's initial detention was an unreasonable seizure. The fourth amend-
ment right against unreasonable search and seizure applies to citizens re-
gardless of whether they are in public or at home. '6 The Court in Miranda v.
Artzona' 7 defines an arrest as a situation in which a reasonable individual,
under the circumstances, would believe that his freedom of movement was
limited such that he was not free to go.' 8
The fourth amendment governs seizures of citizens which do not result
in a trip to the police station and prosecution for a crime. Under the ruling
10. Id. at 57.
11. 660 P.2d 1272 (Colo. 1983).
12. Amsterdam, Perspectues on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 417 (1974).
13. Id. at 417.
14. Id. at 414, citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
15. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 9 (1968), quotig Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891).
16. 392 U.S. at 8-9.
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Id. at 478.
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in Terry v. Ohio,19 whenever a police officer accosts an individual and re-
strains his or her freedom to walk away, the officer has "seized" that per-
son.20 In order to be a valid arrest, the officer must have knowledge, before
the arrest, of facts, not mere rumor or conjecture, 2 1 which indicate that the
person arrested has committed or is committing a criminal offense 22 at the
actual moment of the arrest. 23 Evidence discovered after an arrest cannot be
used to provide probable cause for the arrest. 2 4 Similarly, probable cause for
a search cannot be based on interpretations of the defendant's conduct




A. Stops and Frisks: Terry v. Ohio, Then and Now
In Terry v. Ohio ,26 the Supreme Court set forth detailed guidelines for
the police regarding situations where they are confronted with suspicious
behavior. The Court balanced the citizen's right to be free from unreasona-
ble government intrusion against the state's need to investigate criminal ac-
tivity.27 When such activity happens, Terry permits a seizure of the citizen
for brief questioning and a patdown of his clothing for weapons. 28 This en-
counter is justified by the need for effective crime prevention and detection
by police. In each case there must be a specific factual justification, based on
what the officer sees and experiences, to justify the Terry inquiry.
29
The Court stated in Terry that the justification for the investigatory stop
in each case would be judged strictly by an objective standard. 30 Thus,
whenever a citizen is stopped the police officer must be prepared to articu-
late specific facts justifying that action. These facts do not have to rise to the
level of probable cause - the arrest standard - or even a reasonable belief
that someone has committed a crime. The facts must, however, be sufficient
to arouse the police officer's curiosity and specific enough to be articulated in
court.
31
Terry specifically avoided the issue of whether the police can stop and
detain a person for investigation solely on the basis of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.3 2 Terry held only that a suspect can be physically seized
19. 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
20. Id.
21. People v. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 95, 561 P.2d 373 (1977).
22. Id. at 376; COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (1973 & Supp. 1983).
23. Severson, 39 Colo. App. 95, 561 P,2d 373 (1977).
24. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968); Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. 320,
311 A.2d 914 (1973).
25. People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449 at 457, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1970).
26. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (where the Court
first developed this balancing approach for administrative searches).
28. 392 U.S. at 30.
29. Id. at 21.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 21-22.
32. In a footnote, the Court stated: "We thus decide nothing today concerning the consti-
1984]
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for the purpose of conducting a frisk if the police officer has reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity and a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed
and dangerous.
33
In two related cases decided the same day,34 the Supreme Court devel-
oped and applied the principles announced in Terry. In Sbron v. New York 
5
the Court interpreted the constitutionality of New York's stop and frisk stat-
ute. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the statute, and
held merely that the police acted reasonably. 36 The Supreme Court decided
the best method for determining the lawfulness of a stop and frisk was to
decide each case based on the specific, concrete factual circumstances in-
volved in the police encounter regardless of the provisions of the statutes.
37
The Court ruling emphasized that each case would be judged on its
particular facts in light of fourth amendment requirements regardless of
what labels the state attaches to the conduct involved.38 Although states are
permitted to develop statutory guidelines regarding standards for search and
seizure to meet the needs of local law enforcement, these standards must
meet the requirements of the fourth amendment.
3 9
Sibron further held that police observation of the defendant talking and
associating with known narcotic addicts over an eight hour period was insuf-
ficient to connect the defendant with criminal activity. The ruling empha-
sized that an incident search cannot precede a valid arrest, and that it was
significant that the officer was interested in obtaining drugs, not weapons,
from the search.
40
In Sbron's sister case, Peters v. New York, 4' the Court held that the officer
had not only reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, but also probable
cause to arrest. In Peters, the arresting officer heard noises in the hallway of
his apartment building. He glanced out and observed the defendant with
another man, "tiptoeing furtively about the hallway." 42 When he opened
the door, the two men took off, running down the stairs. The officer caught
one of the men and proceeded to search for weapons. The search produced
an instrument commonly used for burglaries.
tutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of
'detention' and/or interrogation." 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
33. Id. at 30. As one commentator suggests, the lower courts have taken the two elements
found necessary in Terry to conduct a protective frisk - reasonable suspicion of criminal activ-
ity and a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed - and has created from them a bifurcated
standard quite different from the original intent of Terry. Eg., I W. RINGEL, SEARCHES &
SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 13.1(c)(1979).
34. Sibron, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (reported with Peters v. New York).
35. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
36. Id. at 61-62.
37. Id. at 59.
38. Id. at 62.
39. Id. at 60-61. For a view advocating that states give more protection under their own
constitutions see generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individuals Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
40. 392 U.S. at 62-63.
41. 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (decided with Sibron).
42. Id. at 66.
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In upholding the trial court's admission of the burglary tool, the Court
held that:
[D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of stran-
gers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled
with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the sus-
pect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be consid-
ered in the decision to make an arrest.
43
A concurring Justice agreed with the result reached in Sibron, but questioned
whether the Terry stop should be permitted for narcotic possession cases at
all. 44 He also questioned the finding of probable cause to arrest in Peters,
stating that he would have ruled that the officer had reasonable suspicion to
stop but not to arrest.
45
Terry, Sibron, and Peters are the foundation on which the Court built the
law controlling reasonable suspicion to stop a person suspected of criminal
activity. Later cases gave the Court the opportunity to address problems
relating to stop and frisk not foreseen in Terry.
1. The Expansion and Redefinition of Terry
Adams v. W'lliams4 6 extends Terry to arrests for possessory offenses where
the stop was based on an informer's tip. In doing so, the Court recognized
for the first time that an officer could stop a suspect to investigate suspicious
activities without reasonable cause to believe the defendant was armed and
dangerous.
One Justice argued in dissent that the permissive Terry rules should not
be applied to mere possessory offenses.4 7 Another dissenter 48 argued that
Terry was not intended to allow a policeman to stop and frisk a citizen based
on a tip from an untrustworthy source which imparted a mere hunch that
the suspect was engaged in criminal activity. Rather, the Terry search was
intended to apply only where the officer observed, first hand, suspicious be-
havior which he could articulate later, in a court proceeding.
In United States v. Brtgnont-Ponce ,'49 decided three years later, the Court
extended Terry to include stops for nonviolent offenses. The Court expressed
its acceptance of brief detentions for investigative purposes in the narrow
confines of a search by immigration agents for illegal aliens in the border
area.
50
43. Id. at 66-67. One commentator argues that reasonable suspicion to stop would not
have to be so coupled. E.g., 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, § 9.3 at 75 n.99 (1978).
44. 392 U.S. 40, 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 74.
46. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). For a recent Colorado case which has some resemblance to
Adams, see People v. Villiard, No. 835A597 (Colo. March 26, 1984).
47. Id. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d
Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting). See also Note, Investigative Stops in Urban Centers. Upholding the
Constable's Whim, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 963 (1978) (adopts the view that Terry only meant to
apply the stop and frisk rationale in a setting involving the suspicion of potentially dangerous
criminal activity).
48. 407 U.S. 143, 155 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
50. Id. at 88 1.
1984]
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The Supreme Court concluded that Teny, Adams and Brtgnoni-Ponce to-
gether establish the appropriate circumstances in which the fourth amend-
ment permits a limited search or seizure on facts which would not constitute
probable cause for arrest. 5 1 In short, given the predicate circumstances the
Court may approve stops based on no more than reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, even though the officer may not believe that the suspect is
armed and dangerous.
2. Limiting Police Discretion
Contrary to the precedents established by Terry and its progency the
Supreme Court has recently attempted to curtail limited stops in which the
police officer was unable to point to specific and articulable facts to justify
the stop. This was made clear in Delaware v. Prouse,52 where the Court re-
fused to condone the stopping of a motor vehicle based on the officer's inar-
ticulable hunch that the vehicle was unregistered. 53 The Court expressed
concern that such "standardless and uncontrolled discretion" is exactly what
the fourth amendment was intended to prevent.54 In its holding the Court
left open to the states the prerogative to develop neutral criteria whereby
traffic stops are not subject to the "unconstrained exercise of discretion."
55
Three months later, Brown v. Texas 56 found a Texas statute unconstitu-
tional for the same reasons as in Prouse. The statute required a citizen to
identify himself when requested to by the police. 57 The statute was held
infirm because it permitted the police to stop suspects without cause and it
gave too much discretion to the police. This created the risk of arbitrary and
abusive police practices.
58
It is apparent from these decisions that the Court will not endorse unfet-
tered discretion-the police must be able to articulate some reason for en-
gaging in an "intermediate" Terry stop. As the permissive progeny of Terry
indicate, this justification is minimal.
B. Colorado's Answer lo Terry v. Ohio: Stone v. People
The Colorado courts, like the federal courts, hold that although war-
rantless searches and arrests are presumptively unreasonable, 59 the presence
of exigent circumstances may eliminate the warrant requirement. 6° The
burden of establishing exigent circumstances is on the prosecution, 6 1 and the
51. Id. at 881.
52. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
53. Id. at 661.
54. Id. at 663.
55. Id.
56. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
57. Id. at 52.
58. Id.
59. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); e.g., People v. Gurule, 196 Colo. 562, 593
P.2d 319 (1978); People v. Vaughns, 182 Colo. 328, 513 P.2d 196 (1973).
60. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); People v. Hoinville, 191 Colo. 357, 553 P.2d 777
(1976).
61. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); People v. Boorern, 184 Colo. 233, 519 P.2d 939
(1974); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 448, 491 P.2d 575 (1971).
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court must view the totality of circumstances before making its ruling.
62
Under Colorado case law, several factors are to be considered in determining
whether exigent circumstances exist. These factors include whether immedi-
ate action is needed to protect public safety,63 whether the police have prob-
able cause to believe a violent crime has been committed and flight of the
suspect is imminent, 64 or when it is likely that evidence will be destroyed.
65
Exigent circumstances exist when time is of the essence; 66 the degree of ur-
gency involved and the amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant are
crucial factors.
6 7
The Colorado legislature has codified the constitutional standards an-
nounced in Terry.68 The statute requires the existence of three elements for a
valid stop and frisk. The first requirement is that the stop be justified by
some specific information that the person stopped was recently involved in a
crime or that he is about to engage in a crime.
69
Once the citizen is stopped, a pat-down for weapons is permitted when
the officer has a reasonable basis for suspecting that the person is armed.70
This second element does not require absolute certainty, but merely that the
officer point to specific and articulable facts that would warrant a reasonable
and prudent person to believe that his or her safety or that of others was in
danger. 7' A third requirement for a stop and frisk is that a subsequent
search be limited to the purpose of the stop in the first instance.
72
The leading case in Colorado for investigatory stops is Stone v. People.
73
This case sets forth the guidelines for lawful field investigations involving the
temporary detention of citizens on less than probable cause. Stone permits a
request for the suspect's identification and a demand for explanation of sus-
picious behavior. The court set forth three requirements for a valid "Stone"
stop: first, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the person
stopped has committed, or is about to commit a crime; second, the purpose
of the detention must be reasonable; and finally, the nature of the detention
must be reasonable in light of its purpose.
7 4
62. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); DeLaCruz v. People, 177 Colo.
46, 492 P.2d 627 (1972).
63. People v. Cox, 190 Colo. 326, 546 P.2d 956 (1976) (where the defendant drove at high
speeds from the scene of a crime).
64. Id.
65. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976); People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 562
P.2d 422 (1977); People v. Mathis, 189 Colo. 534, 542 P.2d 1296 (1975).
66. People v. Cox, 190 Colo. 326, 546 P.2d 956 (1976); DeLaCruz v. People, 177 Colo. 46,
492 P.2d 627 (1972).
67. People v. Boorem, 184 Colo. 233, 519 P.2d 939 (1974).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (1973).
69. E.g., People v. Casias, 193 Colo. 66, 563 P.2d 926 (1977).
70. E.g., People v. Sherman, 197 Colo. 442, 593 P.2d 971 (1979).
71. Eg., People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 144, 544 P.2d 392 (1975) (stop and frisk was justified
where defendant was seen in area of burglary and officers had seen the name of the defendant
on police flyers describing him as armed and dangerous).
72. Eg., People v. Navran, 174 Colo. 222, 483 P.2d 228 (1971) ("the right to stop and frisk
is not an open invitation to conduct an unlimited search"). Id. at 232.
73. 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971).
74. 174 Colo. at 509, 485 P.2d at 497. Professor LaFave has noted that the reasonableness
of any detention may depend on whether the police utilized an investigatory method designed
to resolve the situation in a timely fashion.
1984)
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The Colorado Supreme Court placed limits on the Stone stop in People v.
Gomez. 75 In that case, the court held that an arrest which lacked probable
cause could not later be justified as an investigatory stop. The Stone case was
also limited in a later case 76 where a statute which gave an officer the au-
thority to require the production of a driver's license did not give the officer
authority to stop any car at his or her discretion. 77 The court reasoned that
to allow this unchecked discretion by the police would countermand the in-
tent of the stop and frisk statute.
78
IV. THE PEOPLE V THOMAS DECISION
A. The Facts
On the morning of September 16, 1981, Denver narcotics officers
Schuelke and Chavez were on routine patrol with two other officers in an
unmarked police vehicle in a Black neighborhood known as Five Points.
While stopped for a red light Officer Schuelke recognized the defendant
Thomas standing across the street in the parking lot of a Church's Fried
Chicken restaurant and alerted the other officers to Thomas' presence on the
street.79 According to Schuelke, Thomas was not moving in any direction;
actually, he was "more or less just standing in the lot." 80 At that time, the
officers did not have information which suggested any criminal involvement
by Thomas. 1
There was conflicting testimony regarding the exact sequence of events
following Officer Schuelke's recognition of Thomas. Detective Chavez testi-
fied that when his eyes met the suspect's, he ran toward the "shack," an
occasional gambling establishment. Later, the detective stated that he drove
around the corner while the defendant walked toward the "shack." Subse-
quently, Thomas put his hand in his pocket, and began to run. The officers
assumed that "at the time [the defendant] was either trying to hide some-
thing [or] had something on him," and pursued Thomas.
2
After stopping the car, the officers chased the defendant on foot into the
"shack." Detective Schuelke saw the defendant throw something into a
water pitcher on top of a vending machine. 8 3 Schuelke ordered Thomas to
stop, pulled his gun, and retrieved six balloons containing cocaine from the
water pitcher.
84
At trial, Thomas moved to suppress the balloons. The motion was
granted and the district court held that the officers' chase was based on bare
suspicion and that the defendant's act of discarding the balloons was the
75. 193 Colo. 208, 563 P.2d 952 (1977).
76. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 42-2-133 (1973).
77. People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81, 550 P.2d 311 (1976); Accord Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
78. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (1973).
79. 660 P.2d 1272, 1273.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1273-74.




product of an illegal chase.8 5 The People appealed to the Supreme Court of
Colorado, which upheld the decision to suppress the cocaine. The Colorado
Supreme Court held that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity when they began their pursuit of the defendant, and that
the cocaine was a product of an illegal seizure of the defendant's person.
8 6
B. The Holding.- Illegal Invest'gatve Stop
In upholding the decision of the trial court, the Colorado Supreme
Court found that the police had no reason to chase Thomas down the
street.8 7 Since the chase and the subsequent stop were unjustified, the de-
fendant's subsequent act of abandonment was the result of an unlawful po-
lice intrusion,8 8 and the evidence was inadmissible.8 9
The court relied on Terry,90 People v. Tate, 9 1 and Stone v. People,9
2 to sup-
ply the objective test for justifying an investigative stop. Before seizing the
citizen, the Thomas 93 court held that the officers must have: 1) a specific and
articulable basis in fact for suspecting that criminal activity has occurred, is
taking place, or is about to take place, 2) a reasonable purpose for the stop,
and 3) a reasonable relationship between the purpose and character of the
stop.
94
The Thomas stop was improper because it did not meet the first prong of
this test. According to the court, the fact that Thomas made "furtive ges-
tures" is laden with inherent ambiguity, and therefore cannot justify a stop
in the absence of other facts indicating criminal activity.
9 5 People v. Waits 9 6
was expressly overruled, because, in that case, the suspects' furtive gestures in
a high crime area were considered satisfactory grounds for reasonable suspi-
cion to stop.
9 7
Focusing on the absence of specific and articulable facts supporting rea-
sonable suspicion, the court held that "the balance between public interest
and - defendant's - right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of
freedom from police interference." 9 8 The Court cited Brown v. Texas 99 in its
discussion of the risk of intolerable, arbitrary, and abusive police practices
inherent in chases based on subjective criteria or less than reasonable
suspicion. 10o
The court concluded that Thomas' efforts to avoid police contact were
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1274.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
91. 657 P.2d 955 (Colo. 1983).
92. 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971).
93. 660 P.2d at 1274.
94. Id. at 1275.
95. Id.
96. 196 Colo. 35, 580 P.2d 391 (1978).
97. 660 P.2d at 1276.
98. Id. at 1276-77.
99. 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
.00. 600 P.2d at 1277.
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not illegal and were not grounds to suspect criminal activity. While Waits
held that flight was cause to reasonably suspect someone of criminal behav-
ior, 10 1 the Colorado court followed the approach taken in a number of other
jurisdictions that such flight is not a "specific and articulable fact" which
could support a stop.
10 2
C. The Dissent." A Restatement
In their dissenting opinion, Justice Rovira and Chief Justice Hodges
restated the issue: did the defendant's flight upon seeing the officers, his
putting his hand in his pocket as he was running, the fact that this happened
in a high-crime area, and the knowledge and experience of the officers who
recognized the defendant create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activ-
ity? 10 3 Although the Justices supported the objective test employed by the
majority, they disagreed with the reasoning and the conclusion.
0 4
The majority was criticized for allegedly misinterpreting Sibron v. New
York. i05 The dissent argued that the factors in Sibron were merely guidelines,
not mandatory considerations. Additionally, the dissent pointed to a propo-
sition made by the majority as to what is needed for a valid investigative
stop. The dissent notes that the Sbron Court was discussing what constituted
probable cause for an arrest and not probable cause for an investigatory
stop. 106
The dissenters contended that under the facts in Thomas, the officers
had specific and articulated facts to support their decision, 10 7 and that there
was virtually no risk of arbitrary and abusive police practice. 10 8 The dissent
stressed that the question of what amounts to reasonable suspicion is a com-
mon sense question. 10 9 In this case, according to the dissent, immediate po-
lice action was required, and courts should ask for a lesser degree of
objectively articulable evidence, as opposed to instances where there is more
time for consideration of alternative courses of action."I 0
The justices lamented the loss of the Waits standard which had allowed
police to make "reasonable inferences" based on their experience in law en-
forcement.III The heart of the dissent clings to the belief that deliberately
furtive actions and flight at the approach of a police officer is an obvious
attempt to avoid contact with the officer. The implication to be drawn from
sudden change in course is that the defendant had engaged in criminal activ-
ity and wished to avoid detection."
12
101. 580 P.2d at 393.
102. See 660 P.2d at 1275-76 and cases cited therein.
103. Id. at 1277.
104. Id. at 1277-78.
105. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
106. 660 P.2d at 1278.
107. Id. at 1278-79.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1279.
110. Id.





A. Attempting to Define Reasonable Suspicion
The reasonable suspicion of criminal activity standard, used for investi-
gatory stops can be defined by comparison to the arrest standard. The only
difference between reasonable suspicion to stop, and probable cause to ar-
rest, is that the latter requires a greater quantum of evidence.
The "reasonable suspicion to stop" standard is generally thought to be a
level of suspicion greater than a mere hunch, but less than the probable
cause required for an arrest.' 1 3 A police officer's observation of the appear-
ance of a suspect, his or her conduct, and the location of the activity all
contribute to a finding of "reasonable suspicion to stop."
Reasonable suspicion to stop is reviewed on an ad hoc basis, 114 by as-
sessing the totality of circumstances" 15 in determining whether it was reason-
able to suspect that the person stopped was engaged in criminal activity.
Similarly, probable cause to arrest tests the officer's ability "to point to spe-
cific and articulable facts, which, taken together with rational inferences
from these facts, reasonably warrant intrusion."' 16
The definition of "probable cause" has probably caused more confusion
than any other aspect of search and seizure law. More often than not, it is
the presence or absence of probable cause that will determine the constitu-
tionality of a search or seizure. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has al-
lowed the required degree of probable cause to fluctuate with the particular
facts of each case.1 7 Professor Amsterdam once wryly noted that recogni-
tion of a sliding scale of probable cause would produce more slide than
scale. 118
B. The Sliding-Scale Approach
Against the backdrop of the Supreme Court decisions regarding fluctu-
ating probable cause standards, a sliding-scale approach has been applied by
various courts, including the Colorado Supreme Court. Significant factors
used in their determinations have included:" 19
1. Personal Knowledge and Experience of the Officer
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court recognized that the officer's experience allows
him or her to view the facts as a meaningful whole demonstrating reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. 120 Other courts have held that the officer's
knowledge of the suspect is an important factor. 12 ' The discretion of the
113. Cf. People v. Branin, 188 Colo. 235, 533 P.2d 1138 (1975).
114. See People v. Casias, 193 Colo. 66, 563 P.2d 926 (1977).
115. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
116. 392 U.S. at 21.
117. Bacigal, supra note 4 at 765.
118. Id. at 786.
119. See Bell, Factors Wh'chjusti; a Stop and Frisk, 6.6. SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REV. 1 (1979).
120. 392 U.S. 1 at 21 (1968).
121. United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 817
(1977); People v. Ressin, 620 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1980).
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officer is limited, however, and reliance on mere hunches is considered insuf-
ficient for reasonable suspicion.'
22
2. Furtive Gestures
The courts have been inconsistent in their definition of "furtive ges-
ture," calling it any conduct which an experienced officer considers suspi-
cious. 1 23 Because such a gesture is often innocent movement on the part of
the suspect, however,' 2 4 it is not grounds for reasonable suspicion in the ab-
sence of additional facts. 125 Nervousness, excitement, or abrupt movement
is generally considered a natural response to confrontation with an officer of
the law. 1
2 6
3. Flight of the Suspect
Flight poses similar problems in that motive is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to ascertain. 127 Some courts have found that simply running in the op-
posite direction from an officer or turning around in the vicinity of an officer
is entirely consistent with innocent behavior.' 28 Other courts, however, have
held that "flight invites pursuit and colors conduct which hitherto has ap-
peared innocent."' 29 The Colorado Supreme Court held in Waits that flight
alone may be sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion when the flight ap-
pears to be a direct response to the suspect seeing the officer.'
30
4. Suspicious Conduct
Suspicious conduct, like furtive gestures, must be considered in light of
the surrounding circumstances 13' and interpreted by an experienced of-
ficer.' 32 Again, court rulings have been contradictory and confusing. In
Terry, the defendants were observed by undercover officers as they conferred,
proceeded alternatively back and forth along an identical route, and paused
to stare in the same store window approximately twenty-four times.' 33 In
light of the officers' experience, the suspicious conduct was grounds for rea-
sonable cause. 134 In Cooper v. United States,' 35 police were held to have rea-
sonable suspicion to stop a man carrying two color television sets in a high
122. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978); People v.
Goessl, 186 Colo. 208, 526 P.2d 664, 665 (1974).
123. See Bell, supra note 119, at 3. See also 660 P.2d at 1275-76, and cases cited therein.
124. Yolo Couny, 3 Cal. 3d at 818, 478 P.2d at 455; Goessl, 186 Colo. 208, 526 P.2d 664.
125. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64; People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81, 550 P.2d 311 (1976).
126. Goessl, 186 Colo. 208, 526 P.2d 665 (1974).
127. Yolo Couny, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 478 P.2d 449, 455, quoting People v. Weitzer, 269 Cal.
App. 2d 274, 292, 75 Cal. Rptr. 318, 330 (1969).
128. McClain v. State, 408 So. 2d 721, 722 (Fla. App. 1982).
129. United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1977).
130. 196 Colo. 35, 38-39, 580 P.2d 391, 393-94 (1978).
131. Commonwealth v. Thibeau, 429 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (Mass. 1981).
132. Tery, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968); Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
dented, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
133. 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
134. Id. at 21-22.
135. 368 A.2d 554 (D.C. 1977).
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crime neighborhood, 136 whereas stopping a man with a television set at a
bustop was found unreasonable in People v. Qurntero.
13 7
5. Similarity to Description of Wanted Persons
Generally, similarity to a description of a person or vehicle is probable
cause for further investigation.13 8 It is necessary, though, for the description
to be specific, 139 unless other factors are present, e.g., presence in an isolated
location late at night.
6. Time and Place of Stop
Location and hour, if coupled with other factors, may give sufficient
color to a suspect's conduct to justify further investigation.140 Rarely, how-
ever, is time and place alone sufficient cause.
14'
7. High Crime Areas
Many courts have found that this factor may color conduct which
otherwise might not reasonably arouse suspicion. 142 Other courts, however,
warn against the ease with which abuse may occur, and discourage use of
this factor. 143
8. Nearness to the Scene of the Crime
Spatial and temporal proximity of a suspect to the scene of a reported
crime is often a relevant factor in determining probable cause.' 44 This does
not justify dragnet-type stops in which any pedestrian is subject to a roving
police interrogation. 145 In Colorado, mere presence at the scene of a crime
does not constitute probable cause for arrest.
146
9. Evidence in Plain View
Under the plain view doctrine, 147 evidence in plain view may be relied
on to establish probable cause.' 48 This doctrine is limited in that !) there
must be a valid intrusion, 2) there must be an inadvertent discovery, S) the
136. Id. at 557.
137. 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983).
138. United States v. Gaines, 563 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1977); People v. Shackleford, 37
Colo. App. 317, 546 P.2d 964 (1976).
139. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
140. People v. Damaska, 404 Mich. 391, 273 N.W.2d 58 (1978).
141. Scott v. State, 549 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1976).
142. United States v. Garr, 461 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972);
People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 144, 544 P.2d 392 (1975).
143. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978); People v.
Marquez, 183 Colo. 231, 516 P.2d 1134 (1973).
144. Bell, supra note 119, at 1, citing United States v. Wright, 565 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 974 (1978); People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 144, 544 P.2d 392 (1975).
145. In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
146. People v. Branin, 188 Colo. 235, 533 P.2d 1138 (1975); People v. Feltch, 174 Colo. 383,
483 P.2d 1335 (1971).
147. The plain view doctrine was fully developed for the first time in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
148. Id. at 455-56; People v. McGahey, 179 Colo. 401, 500 P.2d 977 (1972).
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officer must immediately recognize that what has been discovered is evi-
dence of wrongdoing and must have reason to believe that the item seized is
contraband before he or she may seize what is plainly seen. 149 Inherent in
the plain view doctrine is the principle that the object seized must not have
been put in plain view as a result of unlawful police conduct.
150
In Thomas, the court discusses several of these criteria, holding that the
combination of factors present were insufficient to support a police stop.
The dissent reached an opposite result concluding that the factors present
indeed justified the stop. Although it is rare that a stop will be justified on
the presence of a single suspicious factor, it is similarly rare that only a single
factor will appear in a given situation.151 As the decisions illustrate, not only
does each case depend on its peculiar set of factors, but courts often interpret
the same factors differently, with different courts giving different meaning to
what constitutes probable cause or reasonable suspicion.15 2 This complexity
is exacerbated when one considers that state and federal standards of prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion can and do, vary.
C. Independent and Adequate State Grounds: The New Complexity
The Colorado Constitution has a provision to protect state citizens from
unlawful search and seizure, which is essentially identical to the fourth
amendment. 153 The Colorado Supreme Court may interpret the Colorado
Constitution as guaranteeing Colorado citizens more protection than is given
by similar federal provisions,' 54 but it cannot interpret the United States
Constitution as providing greater safeguards than those delineated by the
federal courts.
The dissent in Thomas argued that the court was establishing a per se
rule which made it unreasonable for the police to suspect a citizen of a crime
for mere avoidance of police contact.155 This may well be true. The holding
in Thomas could give more protection to a state citizen than required by
Terry and subsequent federal decisions. Thus, the United States Supreme
Court is without jurisdiction to reverse the state decision. 156 The state courts
can, and are, expanding their own constitutional provisions to provide
greater protection for their citizens.157
It is probably more than a mere coincidence that the justice writing for
149. 403 U.S. at 468-71.
150. Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. at 324, 326, 311 A.2d at 918, 916.
151. Bell, supra note 119, at 1.
152. Id.
153. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
154. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("[A] state is free as a matter of its own law to
impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon
federal constitutional standards.") (emphasis in original); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967).
155. 660 P.2d 1272, 1278.
156. See Brennan, supra note 39, at 501 n.80.
157. Id. at 495. As Justice Brennan notes, states are construing identical state constitutional
provisions to provide greater protection than required by the federal provisions; See also Develop-
merts in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1370




the majority in Thomas had expressed in an earlier case that the Colorado
Constitution was superior protection for the right of privacy than its federal
counterpart. 158 Even if the dissent is correct in holding that the fourth
amendment does not dictate the result in Thomas, it is clear that the decision
is justifiable under the state constitutional counterpart.
VI. Two ALTERNATIVES TO THE CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS IN
NARCOTIC CASES: THE "ALL" OR "NOTHING" APPROACHES
It is evident from People v. Thomas that the police do not have an easy
task in determining reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop, especially
in narcotics cases. A fresh approach to the problem of pretext searches for
drugs in stop and frisk encounters is sorely needed. The present case-by-case
method should not be used for possessory offenses; rather Colorado should
adopt the "all or nothing" approach in combating drug related offenses.
The stop and frisk situation would then be limited to crimes threatening life
or property. In light of the courts' inability to agree upon a definition of
reasonable suspicion, it is unrealistic to expect a police officer, who is under-
standably unaware of the fine nuances of the search and seizure laws to oper-
ate in this area. The purpose of this section is to explore two alternatives to
the case-by-case analysis used to decide stop and frisk cases involving nar-
cotic offenses.
The two approaches, or a combination thereof, could be strictly limited
to narcotic possession offenses. The advantages of both approaches are es-
sentially the same: establishing clear guidelines for police conduct and re-
ducing resentment against the police.
A. The "A/I" Approach
The "all" approach represents the idea that the police cannot effectively
combat crime involving narcotics by use of the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard. The courts frequently exclude evidence because the stop was arbi-
trary. The "all" approach would alleviate this problem. This approach, as
discussed by Professor LaFave, would permit the police to stop suspected
narcotic possessors for interrogation without the same quantum of suspicion
required by Terry.' 59 This is premised on the fact that the stop was "pursu-
ant to a plan embodying explicit neutral limitation."' 6 0 Professor LaFave
noted two other Supreme Court cases which the Colorado court relied on to
158. Justice Quinn Stated:
I believe that Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution contemplated greater
protection for privacy interests than is presently available under Fourth Amendment
doctrine. We have recognized on other occasions that decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, while entitled to respectful considerations, are not controlling on the
issue of constitutional protections emanating from identical or similar provisions in the
Colorado Constitution.
People v. Spies, 615 P.2d 710, 718 (Colo. 1980). (Quinn, J., dissenting).
159. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); See, e.g., 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 9.3(g)
(Supp. 1983).
160. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 43, at 42-43.
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support this proposition. 16 1 He suggests that the Court might approve of a
neutral plan under the Camara v. Municipal Court 162 balancing test if the po-
lice could demonstrate a particular enforcement problem. 16 3
The advantage to this approach is that the police would not need indi-
vidualized suspicion, as in Thomas, if they operated under a tightly and care-
fully designed plan to limit police discretion. As LaFave noted, the Court
may rule negatively if confronted with a neutral plan to question persons in
an area known for drug users, but a tight and strictly designed plan might
pass muster.' 
6 4
The most likely type of situation where a neutral plan would be ap-
proved by the Court, according to LaFave, is where the plan is used to com-
bat a "special problem" existing at a given time and place, such as a
neighborhood drug market.'
65
B. The "Nothing" Approach
This approach would eliminate an officer's authority to stop a citizen
for a suspected possessory offense. This was the approach taken by the
American Law Institute in drafting its model stop and frisk statute.'
66 Po-
lice officers would only be authorized to stop a person suspected of violent, or
property crimes.
The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure cites two reasons why
narcotic offenses were not included in the stop and frisk statute. First, use of
the stop and frisk in narcotic stops creates an obvious temptation to abuse
the limited search for weapons as a pretext to search for drugs. Second, the
need for stop and frisk as an enforcement tool for narcotic investigators is not
as great as other types of crimes.' 6 7 The vice officers tend to rely more on
informers and undercover agents to apprehend drug offenders than on the
stop and frisk method.'68 This is also apparently the case with the Denver
Police Department.
169
This "nothing" approach reverts back to the original intent of Terry v.
Ohio: that the stop and frisk should only be used when the person stopped is
believed to be armed and dangerous. 1
70
161. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976).
162. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
163. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43 § 9 .3 (g), at 44-45 (Supp. 1983).
164. Id. at 44.
165. Id. at 45. Professor LaFave gives three cases as examples where such a plan could be
utilized: 1) a problem with vandalism; 2) an area of numerous auto thefts; 3) situation involv-
ing special responses, i.e., preventing racial incidents.
166. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2 (Official Draft 1975).
167. Id. § 110.2 commentary at 278-79.
168. Id. at 279.
169. Interview with Detective Sgt. Costigan, Vice and Narcotic Bureau, Denver Police De-
partment, in Denver (Aug. 3, 1983) (stated that over half the arrests initiated by the bureau are
by warrant, more than any other bureau in the department). [hereinafter cited as Interview].
170. Set supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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C. Possible Benefits of Either Approach
The adoption of either approach would result in immediate benefits.
The "all" approach would encourage development of clear guidelines for the
officer on the street. This "neutral" plan would also insure the equal treat-
ment of citizens by reducing the influence of bias and providing uniform
standards and control of police conduct. 7
The "nothing" approach, on the other hand, would help to eliminate
abuse of the stop and frisk as a pretext to search for drugs. This, in turn,
could result in better relations between citizens and the police.'
Both of these approaches could be used simultaneously by amending
the Colorado stop and frisk law 173 to exclude stops for suspicion of a posses-
sory offense, and developing a "designed stop" plan subject to neutral and
fixed standards to be used in special cases should the need arise. A change in
the existing law that would enable police officers to work effectively while
simultaneously eliminating the abuse of the stop and frisk is long overdue.' 74
VII. CONCLUSION
It is essential that both the criminally accused and the police know what
is expected of them; behavior constituting "good police work" one day
should not be grounds for reprimand or dismissal the next. The judiciary's
use of individualized inquiry rather than objective standard has perpetuated
confusion in this area.
People v. Thomas represents an attempt to refine the definition of reason-
able suspicion in stop and frisk encounters. This attempt to clarify an objec-
tive standard for search and seizure does not alleviate problems inherent in
practical application. Implementation of either the "all" or "nothing" ap-
proach would help to eliminate arbitrary police behavior which results in
the suppression of otherwise admissible evidence.
Michelle Conklin
William Mulcahy
171. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43, § 9.
3 (g) at 44 (Supp. 1983).
172. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, 157-68
(1968).
173. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (1973).
174. See generally D. BAYLEY & H. MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE: CON-
FRONTATION IN AMERICA (1968) (a survey of the relationship between the Denver Police and
Minorities); Interview, supra note 169. (When Detective Costigan was asked whether Thomas
would affect stop and frisk cases he replied that it probably would affect convictions, but not
stops. The department still wants officers to stop even if it means no convictions. In fact, Detec-
tive Costigan, before this interview, had never heard of the holding in Thomas although he
personally knew the defendant as a career criminal, with many past convictions for drug related
offenses. When asked if the ruling in Thomas might encourage perjury by the police he an-
swered in the affirmative.)
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